On the occasion of the autumn conference organized by Assofermet, the Italian association representing companies operating in the trade and distribution of steel, non-ferrous metals, scrap and hardware, SteelOrbis interviewed Riccardo Gabrielli, Sales & Area Manager of the Heavy Plates Division at Gabrielli SpA, about how the CBAM, safeguard measures and cost volatility are reshaping the day-to-day operations of steel distributors. From inventory valuation and procurement strategies to relationships with customers and suppliers, distributors are facing increasingly complex challenges. In a market where determining the actual cost of materials in advance has become more difficult, the role of distributors is also evolving, requiring them to absorb a growing share of the complexity across the supply chain.
One of the less visible effects of the new European regulatory framework is the difficulty of determining the actual cost of imported materials. For a distributor, how challenging has it become to accurately value inventories?
One of the biggest challenges is assigning an accurate value to non-EU material held in our warehouses. Several months after the start of the definitive phase of the CBAM, uncertainties remain over which emissions values should actually be applied to imported material: whether the default values established for the country of origin or the actual emissions data declared and certified by the steel producer. For a distributor, this is not merely an administrative issue. It directly affects pricing, inventory valuation, financial management and the ability to reliably determine sales margins. If I cannot determine the final cost of the material with sufficient accuracy, establishing its appropriate market price today inevitably becomes more complicated.
Is this uncertainty also changing the way you decide what to purchase and which markets to source from?
In our case, heavy plates are currently less exposed than other products, as European production capacity is still able to meet a significant share of market demand. This allows us to rely predominantly on European suppliers.
However, in the current environment, minimizing risk as much as possible is essential. We have further strengthened our relationships with major European producers, with whom we already had established partnerships. As regards imports, wherever possible, we try to purchase material that has already cleared customs, allowing us to work with a defined cost and reduce exposure to subsequent uncertainties. At the same time, relationships with customers have become even more important. It is not simply a matter of trying to pass higher costs downstream, which is becoming increasingly difficult, but also of transparently explaining market complexities and the reasons behind certain pricing trends.
Planning horizons have also shortened, as it is now much harder to forecast market developments over the coming months with a sufficient degree of reliability.
Does this mean that distributors are no longer simply selling steel, but are increasingly expected to manage uncertainty on behalf of their customers?
Distributors must become increasingly flexible. Customers are working with more fragmented order volumes and demanding ever-shorter lead times. This is now an established trend in the sector, and we must be able to respond accordingly. The role of a distributor is therefore not simply to make material available, but to absorb part of the complexity of the supply chain. This means managing availability, delivery times, inventories and services to meet customer requirements while also helping them navigate a regulatory and commercial environment that, in many respects, remains unclear.
From the perspective of downstream operators, are the CBAM and safeguard measures genuinely rebalancing the market, or do they risk shifting some of the competitive pressure from steel production to downstream sectors?
A certain degree of rebalancing has undoubtedly taken place upstream. The CBAM was also designed to offset the costs European producers face under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and from this perspective, its rationale is understandable. The main problem, however, emerges downstream. For companies operating in distribution, these measures translate into higher costs that cannot always be passed along the supply chain. The risk is therefore that measures intended to restore more balanced competitive conditions in primary steel production may ultimately undermine competitiveness in downstream segments and, eventually, among European steel users.
With reduced quotas and a 50 percent duty on imports exceeding those quotas, how has operators' willingness to rely on imports changed in practical terms?
The most tangible effects are only now beginning to emerge. With the reopening of quotas at the beginning of October, we will be able to better assess how much purchasing activity has remained focused on imports and how much has instead shifted back to the European market. It will also be important to understand the level of risk operators are still willing to accept to keep certain supply channels open. The new rules are inevitably reshaping purchasing strategies, but it is still too early to fully assess their structural impact.
Have you seen a genuine recovery in steel consumption, or is the current activity mainly driven by quota management and procurement strategies?
What we have seen is primarily a certain recovery in apparent demand, partly linked to quota management, rather than a genuine structural rebound in consumption. Volumes remain broadly stable, while the prices sought by producers are still struggling to gain full acceptance in the downstream market. In our own case, volumes between 2025 and 2026 have remained virtually unchanged, with fluctuations of only a few percentage points.
We are still not seeing the kind of demand growth that would allow the market to absorb rising costs more easily.
With the balance between purchasing costs and selling prices becoming increasingly delicate, how much does logistics affect competitiveness, particularly in export markets?
Logistics has a significant impact, especially when trying to expand sales beyond national borders. Transport and fuel costs are becoming increasingly important and are eroding the competitive advantage of steel distributed from Italy. This is also evident in price differentials compared with other European markets. In the past, Italy could offer considerably greater price advantages for certain product categories. Today, these differentials have narrowed significantly. This also reflects the reduced availability of competitively priced imported material, making it more difficult for both us and our customers to export processed steel products.
Is this leading to a stronger focus on European sourcing, or do imports remain essential for certain product categories?
Our overall approach has not changed radically. Depending on market conditions, approximately 70-75 percent of the material we handle originates from Europe. Imports nevertheless remain an important component, particularly because European production capacity is limited for certain categories, such as cold rolled and galvanized products. The key question, therefore, is where to source specific products when some European plants reduce output or operate intermittently. If the alternative is importing material from outside the EU with a potential CBAM cost of €150, €200 or even €300 per metric ton, procurement decisions inevitably become much more complicated.
As a steel distributor, what is the main mistake Europe should avoid when redesigning the rules intended to protect its steel market?
There is considerable discussion about extending the CBAM to steel-intensive products, and this is certainly an important issue. Protecting upstream production achieves little if semi-finished and finished products manufactured under different cost conditions can still enter Europe from Asia or other non-EU countries. However, we cannot assume that Europe's response should consist exclusively of regulation, protection and restrictions on trade flows. At the end of the supply chain, there must be someone capable of purchasing European products. If every stage of the supply chain is protected through additional costs, the risk is to generate further inflation and make European products increasingly less affordable for end users. What Europe needs above all is a long-term industrial strategy: investment in innovation, simplification for businesses and conditions that make investing and manufacturing within the European Union attractive again.
Regulation is necessary, but regulation alone does not create competitiveness. We must return to investing boldly in European industry. If we simply block and restrict trade flows without simultaneously creating the conditions for manufacturing to grow, sooner or later this model will become unsustainable.
